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BAR BRIEFS
ten years for another felony. He announced that he was going to
take a correspondence course in law and, pinning his faith on the clem-
ency of the female executive of the Lone Star State, he appeared con-
fident that he would soon be out and that he would make a better
lawyer than many with whom he had come in contact. He is still in
the penitentiary and his chances of a pardon do not seem particularly
bright, but he is pursuing his -law course with unabated zeal, and al-
though he has no educational qualifications, in many states he would
be entitled to come before the examining board. In Texas he is auto-
matically barred by a statute which prevents the licensing of anyone
who has been convicted of a felony.
Texas is but one of fifteen states which have no requirements
whatsoever of general education. Seven of these have no requirements
as to kind, quality or duration of the legal training which candidates
are supposed to possess. While this situation is showing improvement
slowly but surely under the efforts of Associations and individual
lawyers in the various states, there is much still to be done. That it
can be done is conclusively proved by the work of the American Medical
Association, through the efforts of which more than three-fourths of
the states require graduation from an approved medical college with a
four-year course requiring for admission at least two years of college
work. The standards which the American Bar Association recom-
mend were adopted in 1921, after being reported on favorably by a
committee of which Elihu Root was the chairman. They provide for
graduation from an approved law school which requires as a prere-
quisite for admission two years of college, or its equivalent, and which
has a law'course of three years if the students devote substantially all
of their working time to law study, or four years in case of an after-
noon or evening school. These requirements were considered as a
minimum by the leaders of the bar ten years ago, and that conclusibn
is much more pronounced today.
Mr. Philip J. Wickser, secretary of the New York Board of Law
Examiners, estimates that in 194o we will have some 24o,ooo lawyers
in this country as against the present legal population of between
I5O,OOO and i6o,ooo. This means an increased strain on the moral and
ethical standards of the members of the profession and requires an
increasingly searching surveillance of the qualifications of candidates,
both moral and legal. Bar associations 4nd legislatures must bear their
share of the responsibility, which they can only do by making every
effort to see that applicants for the bar who knock at the gates in their
states have those qualifications which will most certainly insure an ade-
quate moral and ethical background for the practice of law, as well as
a knowledge of its intricacies.
DEFINING PRACTICE OF LAW
We are indebted to an article by Ewell D. Moore, of the Los An-
geles Bar, in the December, 1930, issue of the Los Angeles Bar Asso-
ciation Bulletin, for the following brief outline of court opinions defin-
ing the practice of law:
What constitutes the practice of law? That is the issue every-
where between the banks and trust companies and the lawyers. The
courts-Federal and State-have spoken on the subject in many in-
stances and in many jurisdictions.
BAR BRIEFS
In Savings Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. 195, the services of an attor-
ney at law are defined as follows:
"Persons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or
proceedings or by warrant or authority of their clients may be regarded
as attorneys-at-law within the meaning of that designation as used in
this country; and all such when they undertake to conduct legal con-
troversies or transactions profess themselves to be reasonably well ac-
quainted with the law the rules and practice of the courts, and they
are bound to exercise in such proceedings a reasonable degree of care,
prudence, diligence and skill."
In Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 386, the Court refers
to practicing law as follows:
"In a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
affected, although such matters may or may not be pending in court."
In People of the State of N. Y. v. Henry Alfani, 227 N. Y. 325,
the Court said:
"It is common knowledge .. that a large, if not the greater, part
of the work of the bar today is out of courts or office work. Counsel
and advice, the drawing of agreements, the organization of corpora-
tions and preparing papers connected therewith, the drafting of legal
documents of all kinds, including wills, are activities which have long
been classed as law practice.
"The reason why preparatory study, educational qualifications,
experience, examination and license by the courts are required, is not
to protect the bar, .... but to protect the public."
In People v. Peoples Trust Co. 167 N. Y. S. 767, i8o App. Div.
494:
The defendant company advertised in the newspapers the drawing
of wills for customers.
The Court said, after citing the language used in the case of Eley
v. Miller (supra):
"The drafting and supervising of the execution of wills is practic-
ing law .... The statute in terms forbids a corporation to hold itself
out to the public as being entitled to practice law, to render or furnish
legal services or advice, or to furnish attorneys or counsel to render
legal services of any kind. This is what the defendant did. Its ad-
vertisements offered to furnish legal advice."
The California Courts have not been silent on this subject. Sec-
tion 281, Code of Civil Procedure of State of California says:
"If any person shall practice law in any court, except a justice's
court or police court, without having received a license as attorney and
counselor, he shall be guilty of a contempt of court."
Section 1209, Code of Civil Procedure of State of California:
"The following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice,
or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the court:
"Subdivision 13: Practicing law, or advertising or holding one's
self out as practicing or as entitled to practice law, in any court, except
a justice's or police court, without having received a license as attor-
ney and counselor, issued under the laws of this state. .. "
BAR BRIEFS
In People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531 at 538. The
Court after citing the cases of Eley v. Miller, and People v. Alfani,
(supra) and many other cases said:
"The essential element underlying the relation of attorney and
client is that of trust and confidence of the highest degree growing out
of the employment and entering into the performance of every duty
which the attorney owes to his client in the course of such employment.
"The essential relation of trust and confidence between attorney
and client cannot be said to arise where the attorney is employed, not
by the client, but by some corporation which has undertaken to furnish
its members with legal advice, counsel and professional services. The
attorney in such a case owes his first allegiance to his immediate em-
ployer, the corporation, and owes, at most, but an incidental, secondary
and divided loyalty to the clientele of the corporation." (Italics ours.)
In People v. California Protective Corporation, 76 Cal. App. 354, at
364, the Court said:
"It is argued that under its articles of incorporation, a franchise
to practice law was 'granted' appellant by the state, and that, the fran-
chise having thus been 'dranted,' appellant should be allowed to exercise
it 'without being subjected to fine for doing so'. While it is true that
appellant usurped, or unlawfully exercised, the privilege or franchise
of practicing law, it is not true that such privilege or franchise was
'granted' to it. The practice of law by a corporation is, as we have
seen, unlawful. The statute did not authorize appellant's incorpora-
tors to call it into being for an unlawful purpose." (Italics ours.)
AUTO INSURANCE AGAIN
Notwithstanding the action of the State Bar Association expressing
the view that licensing, rather than insurance, would best serve our
needs so far as motor vehicle accidents are concerned, there is consider-
able amount of discussion elsewhere in favor of insurance.
Mr. J. Philip Bird, President of the New Jersey Manufacturers'
Association, is quite active along this line. We quote from a recent
statement:
"The insurance policy should insure everyone riding the particular
automobile which is covered, be he riding as owner, as chauffeur, as
business associate or as guest. The policy should insure also any other
person upon the public street, or highway, except the owner, chauffeur,
business associate or guest, riding in the other automobile.
"Those in the other automobile are protected by the insurance
which the owner of that automobile has furnished, and, therefore,
should not receive protection from the policy procured by the owner
of the first automobile.... The law making these changes should pro-
vide a schedule similar to the schedule contained in the Workmen's
Compensation Laws which would fix a definite amount to be paid for
certain injuries. This schedule.., would not depend upon the income
or earnings of the person injured. It would be a minimum schedule
in this sense that there would be nothing in the law to prevent an auto-
mobile owner from procuring a policy containing a higher schedule
than the'law requires.
"However, if the owner procures a schedule higher than the law
requires, reading in favor of himself, or his chauffeur, or the guests in
his car, it should be unlawful for the insurance company to give that
